I. Introduction
The orthodox approach to modeling the Fed's response to economic conditions is to employ a monetary policy reaction function. Most reaction functions are estimated by regressing a policy indicator, possibly the federal funds rate or a monetary aggregate, on variables that describe the state of the economy, such as unemployment, inflation, and growth in output.' Under certain conditions which we discuss below, estimated coefficients from a reaction function provide information about the Fed's monetary policy priorities. Moreover, extending the model to include election and partisan dummy variables may provide information about the Fed's response to political pressures.
There are two problems with interpreting the coefficients in a standard reaction function as the weights that the Fed attaches to its policy objectives. First, the monetary policy decision may not be represented accurately by an aggregate reaction function (one that models the Fed as a whole) because there are twelve voting members on the FOMC. Chappell, Havrilesky, and
McGregor [10] have recently addressed this issue by employing a "disaggregated" set of reaction functions.
The second problem with interpreting reaction function coefficients as the weights the Fed places on its policy objectives is that this interpretation implicitly assumes structural stability of the underlying macroeconomy. Abrams, Froyen, and Waud [1, 31] acknowledge this shortcoming when they state, ". .. coefficients from estimated reaction functions ... do not provide direct information on policymaker utility functions. Rather than being the solution to an unconstrained optimization dependent only on policymaker preferences, reaction functions are the output of a constrained maximization, where the constraints are the reduced-form equations that characterize important determinants of economic fluctuations, then prior interpretations of reactions functions may be invalid.
To illustrate the importance of allowing for this type of structural change in the underlying model (i.e., aggregate supply shocks), consider the following case: Suppose the Fed is faced with a decrease in output. If the decrease in output is generated by a negative aggregate demand shock, the accompanying reduction in inflation allows the Fed to initiate an expansion and trade an increase in inflation for an increase in the level of output. If the decrease in output is generated by a negative supply shock, however, the Fed is faced with the dilemma of increasing inflation further to achieve an increase in output or decreasing output further to achieve a reduction in inflation.
The problem with failing to properly identify the source of the shock is most evident in the context of studies of the political business cycle. These studies generally test whether the Fed is pressured to ease monetary policy prior to elections or during Democratic administrations. However, since aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks may elicit different responses from the Fed, a change in the Fed's response to output may not be due to political pressure but, instead, to a change in the type of shock generating the movement in output. Thus, failure to identify the nature of these shocks may lead to incorrect conclusions about the Fed's response to political pressures.
The purpose of our paper is to identify aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks using the method developed by Blanchard and Quah [8] In section III, we describe the data and present the method that we employ to identify aggregate demand and supply shocks. In section IV, we present the results of estimates of the reaction function for the period 1955 through 1992. Section V summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. A Model of Fed Behavior
We adopt the usual convention and assume that the At the other extreme, suppose a = oo, which implies that the Fed places no weight on the inflation target. In this case, a positive aggregate supply shock prompts the Fed to tighten policy if target output growth rises by less than actual growth (y* -Y3 < 0). Symmetrically, the Fed will loosen policy if target output growth rises by more than actual growth (yi -y3 > 0). Thus, equation (6) shows that there are two sources of sign ambiguity arising from an aggregate supply shock. One source of ambiguity is that the output target moves with aggregate supply shocks. The other source of ambiguity is that the Fed faces conflicting goals during supply shock periods. As a result, the Fed may accommodate aggregate supply shocks or it may respond countercyclically to aggregate supply shocks.
III. Data and Derivation of Aggregate Demand and Supply Shocks
The model presented in section I suggests that the Fed may respond differently to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. In this section, we develop the empirical measures of aggregate demand and supply shocks which we will employ in a Federal Reserve reaction function in section IV.
To identify aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks, we employ the technique suggested by Blanchard and Quah [8] . Their technique involves estimating a structural vector autoregression with the identifying restriction, derived from the natural rate hypothesis, that aggregate demand shocks have no long-run impact on the log of real output.7 Thus, we begin by estimating the following vector autoregression:
6. Equations (2) through (4) are assumed to be linear in the three exogenous variables P, ED, and es. Thus, the cross partial derivatives are zero.
7. Although Blanchard and Quah [8] , and Gamber and Joutz [18], employ quarterly data in their analysis, Gamber and Joutz [17] show that the properties of aggregate demand and supply are unaltered when monthly unemployment and industrial production replace quarterly unemployment and GDP in the vector autoregression. 10 . This reaction function does not explicitly contain the traditional objectives of unemployment and inflation along with movements in output. However, unemployment is employed in the VAR to generate the aggregate demand and supply shocks and this precludes its use in the reaction function. Further, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is a stable relationship between aggregate demand shocks and prices, and aggregate supply shocks and prices. Therefore, we do not include both aggregate shocks and price innovations in the reaction function because the aggregate shocks contain the implied price movements.
11. We started with 12 lags of each variable and successively eliminated lags until a lag was significant. The second lag was the highest significant lag for both aggregate demand and supply. Moreover, a two month lag length is intuitively appealing since we must assume that the policy indicator (Fed funds rate) does not have an impact on the independent variables (aggregate demand and supply shocks) for at least two months. This is quite reasonable since monetary policy is generally viewed as having an impact on the economy with long and variable lags. Further, bivariate Granger-causality tests using two lags of each variable show that the change in the federal funds rate fails to Granger-cause either output growth or the unemployment rate. 12. A potentially attractive method to estimate the Fed's reaction to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks is to include the federal funds rate in the VAR (equation (7)) and employ the assumption that the federal funds rate is contemporaneously exogenous with respect to the other variables in the VAR. This assumption identifies the federal funds rate as the Fed's policy variable. The shortcoming of this technique, however, is that in order to estimate the Fed's reaction to shocks over pre-and post-election periods and Democratic and Republican regimes, we must include dummy variables on each lagged dependent variable in the regression and there are insufficient degrees of freedom to perform this estimation.
13. A one unit increase in aggregate demand translates into a 0.16 increase in industrial production at the one year horizon. A one unit increase in aggregate supply translates into a 0.18 increase in industrial production at the one year horizon. Based on a Chow-test (sample split 1974) we found the relationship between industrial production and the aggregate demand and supply shocks to be stable over the sample period. Moreover, recall from note 6 that we also find a stable relationship between aggregate shocks and prices. Thus, we find evidence of structural stability within the aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. This supports our interpretation of the reaction function coefficients as measuring the response of the Fed to aggregate shocks. Table II. To detect the impact of the president's party affiliation on the Fed's response to aggregate demand and supply, we estimate equation (10) (12 percent level) . The response to aggregate demand under Democratic administrations, however, is 0.26 greater than under Republican administrations and this difference is significant at the 1 percent level.
To assess the impact of the presidential election cycle on the Fed's response to aggregate demand and supply, we remove the partisan dummy variables and replace them with slope and intercept dummy variables that equal one for the 12 months prior to a presidential election and zero otherwise.'4 The resulting estimates are presented in rows four and five of Table I . Consistent with the preceding discussion, the Fed responds more vigorously to aggregate demand shocks than to aggregate supply shocks. The estimated coefficients suggest, however, that there is no significant difference in the Fed's response to aggregate demand shocks in pre-election periods when compared to post-election periods. The same can be said for aggregate supply. These coefficient differences can be found in lines four and five in Table II . In sum, the results reported above indicate that there is significant partisan influence, but no significant electoral cycle influence, on the Fed's response to aggregate demand and supply shocks.
To address the combined effects of party affiliation and election cycle, we estimate equation (10) with both partisan and election cycle dummy variables. These results are reported in lines six through nine in Table I . We find that, during Democratic presidential regimes, monetary policy responds to both aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks more vigorously in preelection periods than post-election periods. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, we now find strong evidence of an electoral cycle in monetary policy, but it is most evident during Democratic regimes. Moreover, during Democratic regimes, pre-election monetary policy responds more vigorously to both aggregate demand and supply shocks than during Republican presidential regimes. This difference is also significant at the 1 percent level.
These combined results suggest that monetary policy, in general, is more activist under Democratic regimes. In addition, monetary policy is more activist in pre-election periods if a Democrat is in the White House. It seems noteworthy that monetary policy is distinctly nonactivist in pre-election periods during Republican administrations and, further, that the Fed responds to aggregate demand with greater vigor in post-election periods instead of pre-election periods during Republican administrations."5 Since Republican monetary policy is most aggressive in the very periods when the Democratic monetary policy is least aggressive, failure to account for partisan effects will make the electoral cycle "disappear." All remaining within party and across party differences are reported in lines six through thirteen in Table II. As a final exercise, we test whether monetary policy responds symmetrically to positive and negative shocks. We estimate equation (10) with separate dummy variables for positive and negative aggregate demand and supply shocks. We found no significant differences in the Fed's response.l6 Thus, while Democratic regimes may respond to shocks with greater enthusiasm, particularly in pre-election periods, there may be nothing particularly sinister in this result. That is, 14 17 . We estimate equation (10) with the level of the fed funds rate as the policy indicator and the first two lags of the federal funds rate as additional independent variables. We find no substantial difference with regard to the Fed's response to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks from those reported in Table I . However, the intercept term may now be interpreted as the level of the federal funds rate under the different partisan regimes. We find that under a Democratic regime the federal funds rate is 0.22 lower in pre-election periods than in post-election periods. This difference is significant at the 5 percent level. We also find that the federal funds rate is systematically lower under Democrats in pre-election periods when compared to Republicans in pre-election periods (0.08 but not significant), and higher in post-election periods when compared to Republican policy (0.13 and significant at the 5 percent level). Thus, we find some evidence that Democratic monetary policy is systematically easier in pre-election periods. These results should be interpreted with caution, however, since the level of the federal funds rate contains a unit root, and thus, test statistics are biased. For this reason, these results are not reported here but they are available from the authors upon request. 
